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PERSPECTIVE
Law and Legitimacy in Sino-U.S. Relations
W. Gary Vause*
I. Introduction
One of the few winners emerging from the Persian Gulf conflict
is the ruling communist elite in the People's Republic of China
(China). The meeting between President Bush and China's Foreign
Minister Qan Qjchen in Washington, D.C., on November 30, 1990,
was the highest official contact between China and the United States
since June 1989, when hundreds of civilians were killed in Beijing
during the Tiananmen massacre-the Chinese Army's violent crack-
down on democracy demonstrators. Although short on substance,
the meeting between Bush and Qian signalled the victory of the Chi-
nese regime's strategy of waiting out world criticism of the
Tiananmen massacre.
The day before Ojan's meeting with the President, China ab-
stained from the United Nations Security Council's critical vote that
authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By its absten-
tion, China allowed the United States to achieve its hard-won objec-
tive of marshalling world opinion against Iraqi aggression, while
preserving China's own relationship with the Third World countries,
including Iraq, which has been a major customer for Chinese weap-
ons. Soon thereafter, as the world's attention was riveted on the
Gulf War, China began a blitz of closed-door trials of prisoners who
had been under arrest or detention for as long as twenty months for
leading the democracy demonstrations of 1989.
The Gulf crisis accelerated the ending of China's isolation, a
process that already was underway by the time Saddam Hussein's
forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990. This essay reviews those
events that led to China's quiet comeback from Western sanctions,
examines the relationship of law and economic reform, and suggests
an agenda for the human rights issue in future Sino-U.S. relations.
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Dispute Resolution, Stetson University
College of Law. Portions of this essay are based on a speech given by the author at the
19th Sino-American Conference on Mainland China in Taipei, Taiwan, on June 14, 1990.
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II. The Changing Hues of Sino-U.S. Relations
It was prophetic that the Sino-U.S. economic rapprochement of
the 1970s could not gain momentum until the passing of China's
supreme leader, Mao Zedong. The United States post-war policy of
containment of communism, coupled with the isolationist policies of
Mao Zedong, ensured that there would be virtually no economic ties
between the two nations throughout Mao's lifetime. Beginning with
the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives towards China in 1971-1972, how-
ever, China later became the major player in the U.S. geostrategic
foreign policy goals of isolating the Soviet Union from potentially
powerful allies in East Asia and distracting it from the United States
protectorate in Western Europe. Additionally, U.S. policymakers
hoped that, through exposure to the West, a process of domestic
political liberalization would accompany the economic reforms in
China.
To serve those goals, the United States became a willing partner
with China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, as he embarked
upon a modernization program in the late 1970s after the death of
Mao Zedong. China's remarkable economic successes that followed,
particularly those achieved during the early years of Deng's reforms,
provided tangible proof that a more decentralized, incentive-based
system, working in close partnership with the capitalist West, could
dramatically out-perform Stalinist/Maoist-style socialism. During
the decade that began in 1978, China experienced a pronounced
shift from the Maoist system of moral incentives to a system that,
although not without a moralist component, emphasized material
incentives.'
Those reforms were not limited to domestic economic issues. In
the arena of foreign relations, China quickly emerged from its posi-
tion of xenophobic isolation with a new openness to the outside
world, and particularly to the West, which possessed the capital,
technology, and "know-how" so necessary to China's modernization.
Although democracy as practiced in the United States was given only
the faintest of lip service, there nevertheless were signs that the Deng
leadership was moving toward political liberalization. Stressing eco-
nomic and geostrategic successes in the new Sino-U.S. relationship,
the United States deemphasized its traditional policy goals on human
rights throughout most of the 1980s in its relations with China.
By the mid-1980s, however, the economic boom in China
brought by the new reforms had begun to slow down, and Western
investors and trading partners were beginning to confront the frus-
trations of doing business in and with China. The romance between
I For a comparative study of the Chinese economy under Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping, see J. PRYBYLA, MARKET AND PLAN UNDER SOCIALISM: THE BIRD IN THE CAGE
(1987).
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Western businesses and China became increasingly troubled at a
time when the divisiveness and frustrations among the Chinese peo-
ple over the slow pace of political reforms were growing. To make
matters worse, Congress and the executive branch had become
locked in a continuing conflict by 1987 over alleged human rights
abuses in China in general and Tibet in particular.
In fairness to the economic reformers in China, many of the
Western investors were unrealistic in their expectations that China
would provide a market of one billion consumers for their products.
Chronically short of hard currency, and with an extremely low per
capita income, China could not offer a viable market for most con-
sumer goods. Even if external export markets existed for the prod-
ucts of Chinese-Western joint venture enterprises, manufacturing in
China was fraught with the difficulties commonly associated with
centrally controlled socialist regimes. Major Western investors, such
as the American Motors Corporation (now Chrysler) with its invest-
ment in Beijing Jeep Company, Ltd., almost terminated their China
operations because of problems with unskilled and unproductive la-
bor, low quality of Chinese goods, high customs duties on imported
components, an inadequate infrastructure, a rigid and meddlesome
bureaucracy, inability to repatriate capital and profits, corruption in
government, and a host of other related problems. 2 Moreover,
China's legal reforms proved to be inadequate, and Chinese bureau-
crats appeared to have trouble assimilating Western notions of law.
Many foreign investors were complaining openly and bitterly during
1986 and 1987, and some threatened to withdraw their investments
from China.
On the domestic front, China was experiencing significant eco-
nomic difficulties, and the reforms were resulting in costly political
consequences. Beijing was unable to satisfactorily address its wage
and price controls dilemma, and was faced with rising inflation and
growing worker unrest. Once nonexistent or at least concealable,
unemployment was acknowledged as a growing problem. Although
once virtually unknown in China, corruption was running rampant,
and became particularly noteworthy when practiced by the close
friends and family members of the nation's highest leaders. Credit
was severely restricted, and by 1989 China already had entered a pe-
riod of economic retrenchment as the reform efforts were slowing
down. On the political front, an internal leadership struggle was
heating up between the progressive reformists and the old-guard
conservatives. With their heightened exposure to the outside world,
2 SeeJ. MANN, BEUING JEEP: THE SHORT, UNHAPPY ROMANCE OF AMERICAN BusINESS
IN CHINA (1989); Vause, China's Developing Auto Industry: An Opportunity for United States In-
vestment- And Challenge for Chinas. New Foreign Investment Laws, 10 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 195
(1988).
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China's university students and intellectuals grew increasingly rest-
less with their lack of political freedoms.
The recurring waves of democracy protests that had challenged
the conservative leadership peaked in Beijing's Tiananmen Square
demonstrations in the spring of 1989. With the benefit of unprece-
dented media coverage, the world watched the entire seven weeks of
confrontation as a popular grass-roots dissent movement challenged
China's leadership. The Party-dominated government, under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, eventually responded with
what many people viewed as lawless abandon. Civilian demonstra-
tors were dispersed by a brutal attack launched by units of China's
27th Army on June 3-4, 1989. A nationwide crackdown on dissent-
ers immediately followed. In view of the progress made in China
through legal reforms in the preceding decade, the new cycle of re-
pression and retrenchment that began in 1989 was particularly
disconcerting.
III. Forging a "China Policy"-The Congressional-Presidential
Debate
Long before the Tiananmen massacre, the Republican Presi-
dents and Democrat-controlled Congress already had been in a
heightened state of conflict over U.S. foreign policy toward China
since the "Tibet Question" focused attention on Chinese human
rights abuses in 1987. Tibet was made an autonomous region after
Chinese troops took it by force in 1950 under the political claim that
China had an historical right to sovereignty over the region. The
Dalai Lama, Tibet's God-King in exile, has argued for many years
that China has no right to dominate Tibet. In 1987, he received sub-
stantial support for his position from the United States Congress.
On June 18, 1987, in the context of debates over amendments to
the 1988-1989 appropriations bill, House Bill 1777, members of the
United States House of Representatives charged China with human
rights abuses throughout China and particularly in Tibet.3 Further,
the Dalai Lama was commended for his efforts to secure peace and
religious freedom in Tibet. The subsequent appearance of the Dalai
Lama before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 4 followed by
a cycle of Tibetan riots and Chinese repression in Tibet's holy capital
city of Lhasa, fueled Congressional-Presidential conflicts over U.S.
foreign policy towards China. 5
The debate over the Tibet Question had not yet been resolved
3 133 CONG. REC. H5217-30 (daily ed. June 18, 1987) (statements of Reps. Mica and
Rose).
4 See Roy, Human Rights Situation of the Tibetan People, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1987, at
50.
5' See Vause, Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1575 (1989).
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when the Chinese Army carried out the Tiananmen massacre on July
3-4, 1989. Threatening the enormous gains in Sino-U.S. relations,
the Tiananmen massacre had immediate ramifications for China's
foreign relations. The fashioning of U.S. policy towards China in the
wake of the massacre became the new focus for the Presidential-Con-
gressional policy conflict. President Bush took the initiative by im-
mediately joining other Western nations in imposing sanctions.
However, the President's sanctions focused on military relations and
high technology exports rather than upon economic ties. United
States military sales to China were suspended, visits between U.S.
and Chinese military leaders were suspended, and sympathetic re-
view of requests by Chinese students to stay in the United States was
promised. Subsequent sanctions imposed on June 30, 1989, in-
cluded suspension of high-level government exchanges and threats
to block new loans from international lending institutions. 6 Dissatis-
fied with President Bush's measured approach, members of Con-
gress introduced several different amendments to the Foreign Aid
Authorization Bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 that would severely
curtail U.S. exports of computers, weapons, and satellites, and fi-
nancing to China. 7
The major industrial nations suspended official and multilateral
agency credit to China as their main avenue of protest. Ten billion
dollars in aid projects from the World Bank and Japan were frozen.8
Under pressure from the United States and Europe, the World Bank
froze loans to China totaling 780.2 million dollars (even though the
loans already had been slated for approval by the end of June).9
In an attempt to limit "subversive" Western influences, Beijing
announced that fewer Chinese students would be permitted to study
in the United States. Although official announcements following the
Tiananmen massacre proclaimed adherence to economic reform
objectives, it was clear by the fall of 1989 that China was locked into
a period of economic retrenchment and reversal of many of the ear-
lier reform efforts. Among key programs aborted were decontrol of
prices, sales of state-owned enterprises, strengthening of the private
enterprise sector, and encouragement of rural enterprises. By early
November, 1989, Beijing had adopted a new economic program that
assured increased political and economic centralization.' 0 A sweep-
ing national crackdown on the growing private enterprise sector oc-
6 Presidential News Conference, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 839 (June 5, 1989);
Bush Imposes More Sanctions Against Being, Asian Wall St. J., June 21, 1989, at i, col. 6.
7 International Cooperation Act of 1989, H.R. 2655, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.; Fried-
man, Congress, Angry at China, Moves to Impose Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989, at A5,
col. 1.
Put on Hold, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 6, 1989, at 69.
I d.
Io Leung, Be'ing Maps Radical Economic Program, Asian Wall St.J., Nov. 28, 1989, at 1,
col. 3.
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curred in the late fall of 1989.11
By early November 1989, the United States Congress had ap-
proved a package of sanctions against China that were designed to
limit economic support, including the suspension of trade assistance
and the elimination of insurance for U.S. companies doing business
in China. The sanctions also froze U.S. exports of satellites, con-
trolled munitions (such as helicopters), and certain nuclear material
and components. China reacted to the sanctions by expressing "ut-
most indignation." 12
Conciliatory overtures were made to China during the "unoffi-
cial" visits of former President Richard Nixon and former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger.' 3 In early December, 1989, President
Bush sent his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to China
in an effort to improve relations with Beijing. Shortly thereafter, it
was discovered that the President earlier had sent Scowcroft on a
similar mission to Beijing in July in violation of the President's own
ban on high-level official visits between the two countries. This only
intensified the tensions between Congress and the White House.
Later, in December 1989, President Bush approved the sale of three
American-made satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets, and
waived restrictions on financing for China by the U.S. Export-Import
Bank. 14 No additional economic sanctions were imposed by the
President.
In an apparent effort to appease the U.S. Congress and other
foreign critics, China lifted martial law in early January 1990,15 and
thereafter announced that it was freeing 573 people who had been
imprisoned for their involvement in the democracy movement. 16
Though President Bush called the lifting of martial law in China a
"very sound step," similar enthusiasm could not be found in
Congress. 17
' ' WuDunn, China Cracks Down on Private Work, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at A3, col.
4.
12 WuDunn, China Irate at Congress'Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at A6, col. 3.
See Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 1990 & 1991, H.R. 1487, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 501 (1989) (limits grants made to The Asia Foundation for the benefit of Polynesia,
Micronesia and Melanesia).
13 Deng responded to Nixon's overtures by saying that "[t]he U.S. was involved too
deeply in the turmoil and the counterrevolutionary rebellion that occurred in Beijing ....
China was the real victim and it is unjust to reprove China for it .... It is up to the U.S. to
take the initiative." Kristof, Better Relations Depend on U.S., Deng Tells Nixon, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1989, at A8, col. 3.
14 Seib & Greenberger, Bush Clears Satellites for China Launch, Asian Wall St.J., Dec. 21,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
15 Ignatius, End of Beijing Martial Law is Called Cosmetic by Many, Wall St. J., Jan. 11,
1990, at AI0, col. 1.
16 Kristof, China Reports Release of 573 Held in Revolt, N.Y. Times,Jan. 19, 1990, at A5,
col. 1. China announced the release of additional prisoners in May 1990.
17 Pear, Bush Hails a Thau; in China: Congress is Skeptical, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at
A l, col. 3.
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President Bush signed the State Department authorization bill
that contained congressional sanctions language in February 1990,
and the State Department subsequently released its annual report on
human rights, containing assessments that were highly critical of
China. 181
The status of Chinese visitors in the United States proved to be
a major point of controversy between Congress and the President
during late 1989 through spring 1990. Dissatisfied with the Presi-
dent's earlier assurances of sympathetic treatment for the students,
Congress passed the Emergency Chinese Adjustments of Status Fa-
cilitation Act, guaranteeing Chinese students and certain other Chi-
nese visitors the right to remain in the United States.' 9 The
President vetoed the Act, stating that he did not wish the extension
of visa rights to be embedded in statute because such action would
upset the U.S.-China relationship and impair his ability to manage
foreign relations. 20 Congress subsequently failed in its attempt to
override the President's veto. 2' On April 11, 1990, the President fol-
lowed through on his promise to provide Chinese in the United
States with similar visa extension rights by promulgating Executive
Order 12,711.22
The timing for the President's consideration of a waiver of pro-
visions under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the U.S. Trade Act
proved embarrassing; the 1990 waiver became due for action by June
3, 1990-coincidentally the eve of the first anniversary of the
Tiananmen massacre. Nevertheless, the President announced on
May 24th that the waiver would' be granted, and Congress was not
successful in attempts to block the resulting extension of most-fa-
vored-nation trade treatment to China. Sino-U.S. relations im-
proved markedly that same month when the Chinese leadership
permitted dissident Fang Lizhi, who had taken refuge in the Ameri-
can Embassy a year earlier, to leave the country.
The U.S. allies who joined in sanctions of China began to renew
economic ties with Beijing within a year following the massacre, in-
creasingly isolating the United States in its persistent application of
sanctions against the Beijing regime. Japan reopened a multibillion-
18 U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, at 802-
25 (1990).
'9 H.R. 2712, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
20 Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration Act of
1989, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853 (Dec. 4, 1989). See also Statement on the Disap-
proval of the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1854 (Dec. 4, 1989).
21 The House voted to override the veto, but the Senate failed to do so. 136 CONG.
REC. H44 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. S335 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990).
22 Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990). This executive order defers
the "enforced departure" of all nationals of the People's Republic of China until January
1, 1994. Id.
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dollar lending program for China after the summit meeting of major
industrialized nations inJune 1990. In October, the European Com-
munity lifted economic sanctions against China. By November, two
large loans to China had been approved by international commercial
banks, while the U.S. delegation to the Asian Development Bank ab-
stained from voting on a major agricultural loan to China supported
by Europe, Japan, and other Asian countries. Soon thereafter, the
World Bank approved a major technical assistance loan to China.
China has taken a number of successful diplomatic initiatives to
further enhance its warming relationship with the West, and with the
United States in particular. A notable example is the change of posi-
tion taken by China in 1990 to support a settlement of the
Cambodian crisis. China's prominence on the world stage was fur-
ther enhanced that year by its normalization of relations with Indo-
nesia and Saudi Arabia. China's tacit support of U.S. efforts in the
United Nations to isolate Saddam Hussein and the meeting between
President Bush and China's Foreign Minister in November 1990 re-
stored at least the appearance of normalcy in Sino-U.S. relations.
Throughout this entire period, Premier Li Peng and the other
conservative leaders who supported the massacre have never wa-
vered from their position that the 1989 confrontation was an "inter-
nal matter" not subject to international scrutiny. Although
repressive measures have been implemented quietly, they have con-
tinued unabated, and dissent is simply not permitted.
On January 26, 1991, the Chinese government announced that
it had tried and sentenced Wang Dan, the Beijing University student
who helped spark the 1989 democracy movement, to four years in
prison. Another dissident, Ren Wanding, received a seventeen-year
sentence. A total of five democracy activists were sentenced to
prison terms. In an attempt to show leniency, three others were con-
victed but released, eighteen were released without trial, and forty-
five were released without charges. All had been held for long peri-
ods, as much as twenty months, after being rounded up in the re-
pression that began in June 1989. Other prisoners were held,
pending trial for more serious offenses. Although officials pro-
claimed that the trials were being conducted "in accordance with
law," it was clear that the traditional approach of Chinese communist
justice prevailed: guilt had been predetermined, and the perfunctory
trials focused principally upon condemnation and punishment.
IV. The Law as an Instrument of Reform and Legitimization
Perhaps the most encouraging indicator of reform during the
decade of 1979-1989 was the trend in China favoring the rule of law
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over the rule of man. 23 The development of a modern legal system
was considered a cornerstone of China's modernization program and
a necessary prerequisite to its significant economic relations with the
West. To that end, Western legal sources were studied, the consul-
tation and advice of Western experts were invited, and numerous
Chinese were sent to study in the United States and other Western
nations.
In 1979, the Sino-U.S. Trade Agreement 24 established the legal
foundation upon which significant two-way trade between China and
the United States would grow at a rapid pace. Adopted in the same
year, the Chinese Equity Joint Venture Law25 provided Western in-
vestors with an unprecedented opportunity to establish enterprises
in China. Other significant laws and regulations were passed in 1979
governing criminal law and procedure, environmental protection,
the judicial system, and governmental organization,26 and the law-
making process continued with vigor thereafter. In 1982, a revised
version of the Chinese Constitution was adopted, promising, among
other things, the right-to vote, freedom of speech, and freedom of
religion.2 7 These reforms were interpreted by many Westerners as
indicators that China was moving toward greater liberalization of
human rights policies.
Understandably, this departure from China's traditional antipa-
thy toward the West and Western legal systems stirred the imagina-
tion of legal scholars everywhere. China's law reform process
attracted the unprecedented attention of Western legal scholars dur-
ing the first decade of reforms; hundreds of law review and law jour-
nal articles were published in the United States addressing Chinese
law, trade, and investment issues. In the United States, a particularly
beguiling notion was that China was moving away from the arbitrary
rule of man and toward the stable and predictable rule of law. The
demise of socialism and the adoption of capitalism, many scholars
concluded, would be the inevitable result of the economic reform
process. Deng Xiaoping encouraged such conclusions by his empha-
sis on separation of Party and government, decentralization of eco-
nomic controls, development of friendly relations with the West, and
23 There are a number of sources for English translations of Chinese laws. The
P.R.C.'s official English translation is I THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1979-1982 (1987) and 2 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1983-1986 (1987)
[hereinafter LAWS OF CHINA].
24 Trade Relations Agreement, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of
China, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
25 Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures,
July 1, 1979, reprinted in I LAws OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 150.
,6 See generally I LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 35-172.
27 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Dec. 4, 1982, arts. 34-36, re-
printed in I LAWS OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 3, 12.
1991]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
adoption of Western-style business techniques and material incen-
tives to encourage productivity.
Deng Xiaoping and his followers took a political gamble in im-
plementing this ambitious program of reforms and in opening China
to the influence of the outside world. Failure of the economic re-
forms would have guaranteed a power struggle in which the reform-
ists could have become political scapegoats. However, the greatest
risk to Deng and other Party leaders was that extensive dealings with
Westerners, with the resulting diffusion of information and ideas
about alternative political and economic systems, would destroy the
cultural isolation that was so necessary to maintain absolute control
over a subservient Chinese populace. Essentially, as is the case with
almost any totalitarian regime, China's ruling elite survived in power
by maintaining the status quo. The changes inherent in a sweeping
economic reform program clearly had threatening implications for
the leadership hierarchy.
The popular democracy movement in China during the spring
of 1989 initially provided encouragement to those who argued that
China's new open-door policy in foreign relations and its domestic
and legal reforms would lead to a more democratic political environ-
ment. In the end, however, Beijing eventually imposed martial law
in the capital by virtually ignoring inconvenient procedures in the
Chinese Constitution. Soon thereafter, the world was shocked into
reality when the Deng government ordered the Chinese Army to use
force in dispersing the demonstrators on June 3-4, 1989. The bru-
tality of the crackdown, the subsequent widespread arrests of those
involved, and the abrupt reversal of many economic reform policies
weakened Western confidence in China's leadership. These events
have had a sobering effect on scholarship about China, as well as
upon Western economic and political policies towards China, and
call into question the legitimacy of China's new legal system and the
government that created it.
V. The Post-Tiananmen Investment Climate
Recognizing that political risk assessment should be one of the
principal concerns of any investor who contemplates doing business
in a foreign country, China had attempted for more than ten years to
develop a legal infrastructure that would give prospective foreign in-
vestors confidence that their investments would be secure. The im-
position of martial law in Beijing in disregard of constitutional
procedures, and the Tiananmen massacre that followed, shattered
that confidence for many prospective investors, and belied the relia-
bility of the legal infrastructure that China had so painstakingly
sought to build during the reform era. Many American investors left
China in the aftermath of the Beijing massacre, and some have not
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returned. Moreover, many prospective investors who were contem-
plating doing business in China have shelved those plans for the in-
definite future.
A study published in March 1990 discloses that many American
joint venture investors in China continued to have serious problems,
including difficulties associated with the shortage of trained Chinese
managers, sourcing materials in China, infrastructure, quality con-
trol, shortage of skilled Chinese labor, foreign exchange shortage,
export and import controls, and shortages of cash. 28 Most of the
pre-existing problems have been worsened by the economic and
political retrenchment. In addition to these practical economic
problems confronting investors, the specter of political instability
makes China a much less desirable site for significant investment.
In spite of the obvious risks, however, investment in China by
some nations actually increased during the post-massacre period.
One of the great ironies is that Taiwan businesses, with their concern
over the threats posed by the Chinese Communist regime, substan-
tially increased their investments in China after the 1989 massacre.29
Investment in China from Taiwan sources grew to an estimated 400-
500 million U.S. dollars during the first half of 1990, representing a
111 percent increase over the same period in 1989.30 Taiwan's in-
vestment rate declined during the latter half of 1990, partly due to
the collapse of the Taipei stock market and lower corporate profits.
The first six months of 1990 reflected a decline of only six and a
half percent in the number of contracts signed by foreign investors,
compared to the same period in 1989 when foreign investment was
still abundant. Significantly, however, the overall dollar value of in-
vestments dropped twenty-two percent, reflecting the trend toward
smaller and less risky projects. In the same period, U.S. firms' in-
vestments dropped seventy-two percent, Japan's dropped fifty-two
percent, Hong Kong's and Macao's dropped only ten percent, and
Europe's rose by forty-five percent. 3'
While the Tiananmen massacre and subsequent political repres-
sion in China no doubt caused foreign investors to evaluate invest-
ment opportunities in China more critically, it appears that business
decisions will continue to be driven by pragmatic economic consider-
ations. By early 1991, it appeared that the major concern of foreign
28 Wagner, A Survey of Sino-American Joint Ventures: Problems and Outlook for Solutions, 12
E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 7, 10 (Mar. 15, 1990).
29 Taiwan's four-year economic plan (1990-1993) specifically encourages transship-
ment trade through Hong Kong and Singapore, most of which goes to China. By early
1990, total Taiwan investment was estimated at one billion U.S. dollars, centered primarily
in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Globalization of Trade, 12 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 24 (Apr.
15, 1990).
3() Cheung, The Water 1argin, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 15, 1990, at 76.
31 McGregor, Foreign Business Confidence in China Remains Hampered by its Cash Shortage,
Wall St. J.. Jan. 17, 1991, at A8, col. 2.
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investors was not so much the fear of political instability and opera-
tional difficulties, but the shortage of credit in China caused by the
continuing austerity program.
Foreign investment continues to be a priority in China's devel-
opment plans. Throughout late 1990, China's leadership struggled
to finalize the next Five-Year Plan. Although Premier Li Peng and
other conservative leaders initially promoted further retrenchment
and return to greater central control (a return to collective farming
was even promoted at one point), compromises were made, and the
Communist Party Central Committee finally approved a moderate,
cautious plan for 1991-1995, along with a broader ten-year "pro-
gram" for the 1990s. The policy of economic openness was
endorsed.
VI. The Future of Sino-U.S. Relations
One of the greatest puzzles that foreign powers must face in
dealing with the United States is the apparent lack of central control
over the making of U.S. foreign policy. This is not a matter of histor-
ical accident; the United States Constitution was deliberately
designed to provide for a balancing and sharing of powers, with the
commerce powers vested in the Congress and the foreign policy
powers vested in the President.3 2 Clearly, economic foreign policy,
which is so critical in today's shrinking global marketplace, crosses
the respective jurisdictions of both branches of government.
America's decision-making apparatus has become exceedingly
complex. Within the executive branch, numerous divisions of gov-
ernment may exercise powers that directly or indirectly affect the
making or implementation of foreign policy. Within Congress, there
is a multitude of committees and subcommittees whose actions also
affect foreign policymaking. With increasing frequency in recent
years, many individual Congressmen have conducted themselves as
if each has his or her own personal foreign policy role in dealing with
foreign nations.33
In spite of this expansive governmental pluralism, the Republi-
can Presidency and Democrat-dominated Congress have been able
to formulate and implement significant foreign policy measures since
the Chinese reform process began. However, consistency and pre-
dictability in our foreign policy toward China have become extremely
difficult to maintain. For some time now, the divisiveness in the U.S.
foreign policymaking apparatus reflects the difficulty of balancing
.12 Presidential powers over foreign affairs are grounded primarily in article II of the
U.S. Constitution. Congressional powers over foreign commerce are found principally in
article I, section 8.
: Brock, The Prnce fetternichs of Congress, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Feb. 1990, at
22-27.
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human rights concerns with the demands of realism in foreign
relations.
The coming end of the post-World War II bipolar balance of
powers likely will yield a new multipolar international regime in
which five powers will predominate: the United States, the U.S.S.R.,
the European Community, Japan, and China.34 Although China
largely remains an undeveloped country, its vast land mass is strate-
gically located in Asia, and it fields one of the largest standing ar-
mies, contains significant resources, and is home for approximately
one quarter of the earth's population. Clearly, China must be in-
cluded as an important nation in the making of American foreign
policy-both from geopolitical and economic perspectives.
The measured approach of President Bush, which has been care-
fully calculated to avoid a rupture in U.S.-China relations, is based
on the practical recognition that China will continue to be a major
world power. To the extent that it remains integrated into the world
economic scheme, China will be susceptible to external influences,
including positive influences in the area of human rights. It is un-
likely that China will return to its dark ages of isolation and ethno-
centrism, but if it should do so, the democratic nations will have little
opportunity to influence this last major holdout for Stalinist-style
repression.
If communism continues its rapid worldwide decline, the United
States policymaking apparatus faces a difficult transition from its sin-
gle-minded focus on the Soviet threat; new policies must be devised
in the post-Cold War world in which there will be no single, clearly
identifiable national security menace. While the Persian Gulf War
highlights the continuing risks of regional conflicts, the United States
focus on geostrategic concerns should be reduced if the Cold War
actually ends. 35 At the same time, the United States must develop a
new and concentrated focus on international competitiveness in the
economic arena. Thus, foreign economic policy predictably will be in
its ascendancy during the decade of the 1990s; international trade,
investment, and finance will become the sources of both alliances
and conflicts.
'14 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE-REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY 6-7 (1988) (report listing the U.S., the
U.S.S.R., Japan, and China as possible major powers of the future). The report predicted
that by 2010, China and Japan will have the economic capacity to act as major world pow-
ers. Id. at 7.
35 Contrary to the popular view that the Cold War has ended, the actions of the
Gorbachev regime in the Soviet Union during late 1990 and early 1991 suggest that such
optimistic conclusions may be premature. As this essay goes to press, the Soviet Army's
bloody crackdown in the Baltics, resignations of key reformers, Soviet equivocation on the
United States role in the Persian Gulf, and the recent strengthening of the KGB, the mili-
tary, and the Communist Party, all suggest that the rapprochement between the United
States and the Soviet Union may be in serious jeopardy.
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The United States also must develop a uniform and consistent
approach in its China policy, avoiding the roller-coaster cycles of ro-
mance and sanctions. The certainty of periodic battles between the
President and Congress does not provide an impressive scenario on
the world stage for U.S. policymaking. The conflicts between geopo-
litical and economic concerns on one hand, and human rights con-
cerns on the other, likely will not end, but should be moderated. As
Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and other nations quietly
continue to expand their economic ties with China, the United States
appears to be floundering in its own quandary of divisiveness. While
no American business wants to be identified with the Tiananmen re-
pression, many have argued that the United States needs a good
dose of realpolitik, or realism.
The human rights issues in the Sino-U.S. relationship likely will
remain dormant so long as the Persian Gulf conflict endures. By
summer of 1991, however, China likely will rise again to the top of
Congress' human rights agenda, as the annual deadline for renewal
of China's most-favored-nation treatment approaches. On October
18, 1990, the House of Representatives voted on whether to sanction
the Beijing government by removing this trade privilege that China
has enjoyed since 1980.36 However, the House vote of 247-to-174
fell short of the two-thirds needed to override the President's deci-
sion to renew the special treatment for another year.
Several factors should emerge in the renewed debate next sum-
mer. China's recently adopted Five-Year Plan for 1991-1995, while
encouraging foreign trade and investment, also emphasizes the no-
tion of "self-reliance," an idea held sacred by conservatives in China
from Mao Zedong to Li Peng. While Li Peng has allayed his attacks
on past reform policies, he continues to emphasize retrenchment
and central planning. A central feature of the retrenchment process
has been tight control over foreign imports and increased emphasis
on export generation.
Although China has sought to reduce its reliance on the U.S.
market by aggressively exploring markets in Southeast Asia, the
United States is still a major purchaser of Chinese goods. Chinese
trade surpluses with the United States soared from six billion dollars
in 1989 to approximately eleven billion dollars in 1990; China's pro-
jected trade surplus for 1991 has been estimated at fifteen billion
dollars. 37 There is widespread and growing concern in the United
States that these trade surpluses are rising not because of competi-
tive factors, but due to calculated decisions by Beijing's central au-
thorities on such matters as targets, quotas, administrative guidance,
M Farnsworth, Chinese Tactics in Trade to U.S. Raise Concerns, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1990,
at AI, col. 2.
37 Id.
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and other market-distorting, anti-competitive activities. In short, the
accusation is that China has imposed artificial barriers on imports
while engaging in the dumping or subsidization of exports to the
United States. These concerns are bound to generate heated discus-
sions in Congress over Sino-U.S. trade, and the human rights issue
inevitably will become a part of the debate. China again will be
forced to wrestle with the necessity of implementing free market re-
forms, and ending the unfair trade tactics of a centrally controlled
economy, if it is to be a major player in international trade.
Moreover, the economic cost of maintaining "stability" through
a centrally controlled system of employment is very high. Mao
Zedong's notion of the "iron rice bowl," whereby every worker is
guaranteed employment by the state, has enjoyed a rebirth during
the post-massacre period of retrenchment, and it is proving to be a
substantial drain on the nation's resources as the government at-
tempts to prop up inefficient state enterprises. The necessary mas-
sive injections of fresh credit have created new sources of
inflationary pressures while only temporarily disguising real unem-
ployment levels.38
Another key lesson that China can derive from its own experi-
ence since the economic reforms began in 1979, and particularly
from its experience during and after the Tiananmen massacre, is that
economic reforms can never be wholly successful without accompa-
nying political reforms. China has adopted many of the trappings of
a modern democratic state, including a written constitution that on
its face promises such freedoms as those respecting religion and
speech. However, unless the rule of law, as opposed to the rule of
man, is adopted and assimilated into China's political culture, all of
the carefully drawn laws and regulations will remain as nothing more
than window dressing for a repressive totalitarian state.
Legal and political reforms are needed in China at the most fun-
damental level to provide a structure for peaceful, systematic, and
scheduled transfers of power. One of the greatest deficiencies of the
modern Chinese communist state is that it perpetuates the errors of
its feudalist past: a small group of ruling elite continues to cling to
power, with the use of military force, long after the confidence of the
people has been lost. Some system of balance of powers is sorely
needed, coupled with an established system for the orderly transfer
of power. The macabre death-watch over aging emperors during
China's feudal period is being repeated over and over in the commu-
nist era, delaying needed reforms according to the cycles of mortality
of individual rulers.
Until the Chinese leadership is willing to address the need for a
38 See Delfs & Bowring, Chinas Credit Gamble, FAR E. ECON. RE'., Dec. 6, 1990, at 40.
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basic reform of the nation's political structure, China will continue to
face recurring setbacks in economic reform, recurring waves of dis-
sent, repression and isolationism on the world stage, and foreign
policy dilemmas in its relations with the free world. No amount of
superficial law reform will provide an effective palliative for such fun-
damental deficiencies.
